The increasing impact of the international trade governance regime on the domestic regulatory sphere and the growing inter-linkages between international companies through their involvement in global value chains, have complicated corporate political activity (CPA) in the trade arena and changed the way companies interact with governments in this context. This paper draws on several recent examples of novel forms of CPA in trade conflicts at both multilateral and regional (EU) level, to provide an updated conceptual framework of trade policy CPA, which takes account of the increasing complexity and interconnectedness in the world economy. We highlight, in particular, the fact that this changing context means that 'domestic' interests are often heterogeneous. The international linkages of a firm may dictate trade policy preferences more than its nationality. In addition, non-government actors increasingly react to globalization by mobilizing transnationally, with positive and negative impacts for CPA. CPA strategy has adapted to that reality, in both home and host country contexts, leading to novel cross border alliances and even political activity in countries where, although local presence is relatively low, companies find common interests.
nature of linkages both between and within firms and with their home and host governments, as well as encouraging non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to militate at the international level. As a result of these different factors CPA in the trade arena has changed significantly. Yet Baron's trade policy-making conceptual framework and the work based on it, has not been revisited to take account of these evolutions. In this paper we will argue that some of the assumptions behind Baron's framework now require revision. We focus on the following question: how have the globalization of value chains and increasing coverage and complexity in international trade governance impacted on CPA in the trade policy arena? In answering this question, we develop a modified conceptual framework of CPA and trade policy, which integrates today's more global and complex context in terms of production, stakeholders and trade governance.
Our modified framework will integrate two important evolutions, which are absent in Baron's conceptualisation and most of the work building on it. Firstly, the globalisation of production structures and trade governance and the subsequent emergence of transnational and multilateral lobbying and secondly, the expansion of the trade policy arena beyond classic trade issues and traditional company actors.
In terms of the first evolution -globalisation -most existing work on CPA and trade policy is based on a classic two country: two industry model (in Baron's case, US/Japan: Kodak/Fujifilm), with lobbying focused on the home country and the bilateral relationship. Baron acknowledged that the 'home' country of company headquarters may not be the best perspective and that the 'rent chain' might be a better lens to view the likely political influence of a company. 9 This concept of mobilizing the rent chain for more effective CPA was further developed in a later paper, where he noted: 'In addition to sharing the cost of nonmarket strategy more broadly, rent chain mobilization can contribute to the coverage a firm or coalition can generate.' 10 However, he did not incorporate international activity into his framework, where policy-making remains essentially domestic -the coverage of a rent chain coalition was defined in terms of number of (US) legislative districts mobilized. We argue that the expansion of global production 9 Baron 1997: p.158 10 Baron 1999 : p. 22 emphasis in original networks has considerably expanded the potential for interest mobilization beyond the home country.In the Kodak/Fuji case, the rent chain and the home country coincided, a situation that was common at the time. However in recent years we have seen an increasing number of Multi National Enterprises (MNEs) undertaking CPA outside of their home country, in response to threats and opportunities along their 'rent chain'.
In addition, another factor anticipated in Baron's work -the growing importance of action at the multilateral (the World Trade Organization [WTO]) rather than the bilateral level 11 -has also become much more generalized in CPA. Particularly since with the founding of the WTO in 1995 and the establishment therein of a more effective and binding Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
We argue that the internationalization of both production and trade governance need to be more effectively integrated into our understanding of how companies interact with the political process through their nonmarket strategies.
The second important evolution which we highlight in this paper is how 'trade' policy has expanded well beyond classic 'trade' issues and now involves a much wider range of actors. 12 As
Vogel pointed out in 1996, 13 CPA expanded because the government's role in the economy increasingly incorporated issues with direct impacts on companies' business models, like health, safety and environmental protection. Since then, the trade policy remit has itself expanded, Increasingly the DSB is called upon to rule on domestic regulation on precisely the issues Vogel highlights, in view of their links to trade. There is now a growing body of jurisprudence from the WTO DSB relating to the compatibility of national regulation on key issues like environmental protection and public health with member states' WTO commitments. This has widened the trade policy remit, but also increased its relevance to civil society actors, who have expanded their transnational advocacy. 14 Given their potential to impact on national governments' legislative autonomy, WTO judgments have been subject to extensive scrutiny by academics and civil society. 15 Thus in tandem with an expansion of the domestic political agenda affecting 11 Baron 1997: p.164 12 Woll and Artigas, 2007 13 Vogel 1996 14 Betzold 2014; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Phelps Bondaroff 2014; Mukherjee and Ekanayake 2009; Rietig 2016. 15 e.g. Howse and Levy 2013; Read 2005; Vogel 2013; Davis, 2009. business, that same agenda has increasingly been subject to scrutiny by the international trade regime, bringing trade policy once more center stage in terms of MNEs' concerns and providing multi-level arenas for CPA on regulatory issues. 16 Empirically, this paper draws on analyses of a series of recent trade disputes at multilateral and regional level, which highlight how globalization, GVCs (as 'rent chains' are now more commonly termed) and increasing regime complexity have changed the CPA strategies of MNEs. Based on these analyses, we propose a revised model of international CPA in the trade policy arena, which takes into account the evolutions which we identify. Our focus is on trade policymaking, however the important characteristics which we identify are also relevant to understanding CPA more widely, as well as to other areas of NMS. For example in the area of CSR, recent research has highlighted how the rise of international NGO movements and extensive networks between stakeholders, has forced companies to adapt their strategies. 17 In addition, the evolutions we highlight -i.e. the growing influence of NGOs in regulatory debates, the variety of interests within domestic industry and the potential for companies to engage in multi-level CPA -have the potential to impact on CPA in many different issue areas, from environmental protection to taxation policy. Our objective therefore, is to contribute, not only to analysis of trade policy making, but also our wider understanding of how CPA is adapting to a more integrated and multi-level global context. Doh et al. 2012; Hillman et al, 2994 ; Lawton et al. 2013 ; Shaffer, 1995 ; Mellahi et. al. 2016 reviews of the literature. 19 They highlight that existing research has tended to focus on why firms engage in CPA and whether it affects performance, 20 as well as understanding the context of CPA, especially the impact of institutions. 21 Our focus is less on the former questions of the antecedents and outcomes of CPA, than on the latter, of how to better understand its evolution in the context of shifting institutional contexts.
In terms of the different models and typologies presented in the literature, 22 our objective is to contribute to understanding the interaction between CPA and firms' evolving institutional context, specifically the work which Lawton and his co-authors identify as seeking to '…help explain the process of change and adaptation of CPA in the context of globalization…' 23 As their review highlights, much of the work in this research stream has looked at CPA in emerging markets and has focused on the national level. The potential for multilateral trade liberalization to change government business relations is noted in their review, however work in the area was little explored. 24 This is unfortunate, as CPA needs to adapt, not just to the rise of emerging markets, but also to the expansion of GVCs and global governance. Several existing analyses, which we will draw on in this paper, contribute to our understanding of this process of change.
This paper seeks to better integrate these insights into our understanding of CPA.
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The aforementioned work by Baron
26
, is of course a seminal contribution to existing understanding of CPA. It has been very influential in theory building . His work draws heavily on cases of company CPA (mainly in the US) related to trade policy, or intergovernmental negotiations. 27 Baron's work generated an extensive body of literature. Much of this research has focused on: a) the domestic context, analyzing how companies seek to influence their 19 Shaffer, 1995; Hillman et. al. 2004; Lawton, McGuire and Rajwani 2013; Lux, Crook and Woehr 2011; Mellahi et al, 2016 . 20 Hillman et. al. 2004 Lux, Crook and Woehr, 2011; Mellahi et al, 2016 . 21 Doh, Lawton and Rajwani, 2012; Lawton, McGuire and Rajwani 2013; 22 Doh et al, 2012 ; Hillman et al, 2004 ; Lawton et al, 2013; Mellahi et. al. (2016) 23 Lawton et al, 2013 : 93. 24 The only paper referenced in Lawton et al's (2013) review, is one on how WTO membership transformed government business relations in Brazil: Shaffer, Ratton Sanchez and Rosenberg, 2007 . 25 Doh, McGuire and Ozaki, 2015 ; Davis 2009; Lawton et al. 2009; Shaffer, 2003. 26 Baron 1995 Baron , 1997 These are, in Baron (1995) the Cemex antidumping case, Toy'R'Us lobbying of the government to put pressure on Japan to revise regulations on retailing and in Baron (1997) , Kodak's filing of a Section 301 case in the US to force the government to address restrictions on their market access in Japan.
government; 28 b) the factors which affect such influence; 29 and c) the role of non-business groups in counteracting business led CPA. 30 However, we will argue that the nature of CPA in the trade arena has evolved considerably since Baron's early conceptualisation and that a wider set of factors need to be integrated into our conceptual framework of CPA in this arena.
Firstly, most existing work views trade lobbying as an internal domestic activity, where a given government's political choices are the result of lobbying by domestic political actors. 31 The conventional view is that import-competing firms lobby domestically for protectionist policies, while exporters encourage domestic decision makers to negotiate trade deals that increase access to foreign markets. 32 In other words, the assumption is that independent, domestic based company lobbying is the norm in the trade arena. A lack of trust is assumed to exist across companies and, even more so, across borders, which precludes cooperative CPA beyond Finally, the emergence of a stronger multilevel governance system within the WTO both expands the reach of 'trade' policy beyond classic 'trade' issues and increases regime complexity in the area. 45 The WTO and its DSB in particular, provides a new level of policy-making, or at least policy oversight of domestic policy. This opens the possibility for company agency on trade policy well beyond the classic issues of domestic market protection or foreign market opening.
In addition, as tariffs have fallen over time, barriers to trade are more likely to emanate from 'behind the border issues' of domestic regulation, 46 Lawton et. al. 2009 . 48 Howse and Levy 2013; Sykes 2014 . 49 Windsor 2007 . 50 Davis, 2009 3
Research question and approach
As indicated in the introduction, our key research question is 'How have the globalization of value chains and increasing coverage and complexity in international trade governance impacted on CPA in the trade policy arena?' Specifically we seek to draw on analyses of CPA in recent trade disputes to highlight how company strategy has responded to these joint institutional evolutions. Building on these findings we propose a revised conceptual framework of trade policy We chose four cases to inform our analysis, on the basis of two key criteria.
Firstly that some or all of the novel elements which we highlight above can be seen to have influenced company strategy and secondly that they were high profile and therefore relatively This paper is a conceptual paper and, as such, is mainly based on secondary data. However, one or both authors have undertaken primary research on all of the cases covered in this paper, including interviews with the key actors, which inform our analysis. We are well aware of the difficulties of generalizing from case studies, however an increasing number of scholars consider that social sciences have become too reliant on quantitative research and have argued that qualitative case studies can provide useful insights for theory building 52 . In one of the first attempts to summarize CPA literature, Shaffer noted that case studies had provided important contributions and defended their importance: 'As a research problem, political influence activities may be particularly hard to describe using statistical methods'
53
. This section will explore the four chosen cases of trade conflicts. To put them into context, we will briefly highlight the main features of the Kodak-Fuji case on which Baron's framework was based. The core of that case was the alleged tolerance of anti-competitive practices in the Japanese market, which restricted Kodak's market access, enabling Fujifilm to make abnormal profits, with which they subsidized sales elsewhere. Kodak chose to challenge these practices, not in Japan, where it had little political influence, but in its home country, the US, through a Section 301 market opening petition. The US administration ruled in favor of Kodak and subsequently complained about Japan's anti-competitive practices in the WTO. Kodak's CPA in the case was multifaceted and extensive, but essentially domestic. Although they did seek to undertake CPA in Japan, it seems to have had little impact.
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Antigua-US gambling
In 2001, the US introduced several state and federal laws to severely restrict online sports betting. Under the new rules, it was prohibited for firms (partly) based in other WTO member states to provide cross-border betting services to US customers. However, betting offered on horse races by fully US based companies and online lotteries in some US states remained legal.
In 2003, Antigua and Barbuda -a small twin-island state in the Eastern Caribbean -brought a 55 Baron, 1995; 1997 56 Andersen and Hanne, 2010: 52. 57 See e.g. Andersen and Hanne, 2010; Reichertz, 2004 . 58 Baron 1997 WTO DS case against the US, alleging that the new US betting laws were in violation of the principle of "national treatment" and hence The case is interesting in light of our paper because of the key role of In sum, the Antigua-US gambling case challenges the conventional view that, when seeking redress in an international trade dispute, firms lobby their own government. Unlike Kodak, these US MNEs were not seen as important actors in their domestic economy and faced strong opposition from powerful domestic interest groups. They therefore chose to challenge the legislation at multilateral level, through the state where they based much of their economic activity. The small size and power of that state was counteracted by the resources of the MNEs mobilized in support of their challenge. The fact that Antigua won the challenge on several key points indicates that such a strategy can be effective, although so far the US has failed to bring its law into compliance, underlining the limitations of even the WTO's legal machinery.
EU-China Footwear
In 2005 the quota system which had restricted trade in many fashion goods came to an end and trade between WTO members was liberalized. It quickly became evident that the liberalization was impacting strongly on exports from China, which increased very rapidly to most affected markets. 69 Intense pressure was put on policy makers by local manufacturers in both the EU and the US to react. In the case of the EU footwear sector, the outcome was an industry request for an AD investigation to secure protection against 'dumped' exports. Further to the ensuing 66 Liu, Lu and Veenstra 2014. 67 Thus the footwear case challenges the classic view of CPA in the trade policy arena in two ways.
Firstly, import-dependent firms in the EU overcame the intrinsic difficulties with collective action to lobby against trade protection and secondly, once they failed to secure an overtly positive outcome domestically, these same EU companies engaged in transnational CPA and lobbied a foreign government to challenge their own governments' handling of the case at the WTO.
EU-China solar panels
In July 2012 a coalition of EU solar panel producers who had mobilized together in an ad-hoc alliance called Prosun, filed a complaint with the European Commission alleging that Chinese solar panels were being sold on the EU market at dumped prices. Thus the solar case, like the footwear case, highlighted the fact that differential integration into GVCs is increasingly changing the balance of interests within 'domestic' industry. In addition, it is creating the conditions for both import-dependent firms and foreign companies to engage more actively in the political process in defense of openness. The case shows that, under certain circumstances, foreign companies may become involved in CPA. The Chinese companies in this case were instrumental in establishing the AFASE alliance. Rather than relying on their home government to put pressure on the EU, they actively engaged in the political process within the EU.
WTO challenge by five countries to Australia's plain packaging legislation
In 2012 Australia became the first country in the world to introduce a legal requirement that cigarettes and other tobacco products be presented in plain packaging (PP), as a public health measure to reduce tobacco consumption. This move was vehemently opposed by the tobacco industry who argued that their intellectual property was being appropriated. In the context of this paper, the political behavior by the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) is interesting for three reasons. Firstly, the action took place at national and international level at the same time. As WTO litigation is a very costly affair, the traditional view is that firms only resort to lobbying for WTO action after all other options have been exhausted. 94 However, the TTCs were engaged in lobbying for WTO litigation, while at the same time also pursuing investor state arbitration in the context of a BIT and a domestic court case in Australia. The recourse to several different policy arenas is unusual. In the presence of high levels of uncertainty on the outcome of different levels of action, it seems likely that the TTCs saw the choice of several different arenas as the most effective way to secure a positive outcome.
Brooks has argued that, even in the US domestic context the complexity of trade policy-making requires a meta-strategy, which, although it may appear to consist of 'do everything and see what works', is in fact a conscious integration of sub-strategies which are mutually supportive. Pursuing such a 'meta-strategy' also provides the opportunity to shift the framing of the key points at issue to the most supportive arena, as the outcomes at different levels emerge.
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Secondly, the choice of governments for CPA in this case was unusual. Finding common interests with a member state of the WTO was an inevitable step in mounting a multilateral challenge. As highlighted above, only states can bring cases against other governments' policies in the WTO However, one would have expected BAT or PMI to lobby their home state (the US)
to challenge the Australian legislation in WTO -rather than Ukraine, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Cuba or Indonesia. In the case of tobacco, the reason for the recourse to host countries seems to lie in the limited political influence of these companies in their 'home' countries. Like in the gambling case above, tobacco is considered a 'sin industry' and thus suffers from a growing lack of political support. This is especially so in developed countries with increasingly extensive and well-established tobacco control regulation. 97 Non-governmental actors have been an important factor in this evolution, with an 'epistemic community' of NGOs, academics and public health professionals increasingly capable of challenging the strategies of tobacco companies internationally. 98 As a result, the chances of persuading a home country of one of the TTCs to pursue a case were low and the pool of likely target states for CPA beyond their home countries was relatively limited.
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Thirdly, none of the plaintiff countries in the PP case was a significant exporter of tobacco products to Australia. They were unlikely to be strongly affected by the new restrictions and thus subject to rather limited compensation, even if the case were to be ruled in their favor. Fooks and Gilmore 2009; Curran and Eckhardt, 2017. by that regime. 101 The choice by the complainant countries to pursue the PP case seems likely to be related, not to outward FDI, but rather to inward FDI.
The tobacco industry is among the most concentrated in the world: 102 four MNEs control more than half of the global tobacco market outside China. 103 TTCs are present worldwide and although their geographic coverage varies depending on their individual histories, one, or several TTCs are active on most world markets. Production facilities are more concentrated, with a few large factories often serving as hubs for local regions. 104 This gives the companies political leverage with some host states. 105 Like Antigua in the gambling case, these countries are part of the 'rent chain' of the TTCs and therefore legitimate targets for CPA.
Aside from Cuba, the complainants in the PP case generally have an important presence of TTCs, including through processing facilities 106 . Like Antigua, the complainants are relatively small and/or developing states, with limited administrative capacity. 107 However here too, the MNEs involved provided material support. BAT is paying the legal expenses of Honduras and Ukraine, while PMI has paid those of the Dominican Republic. 108 The case thus represented a major financial investment for the TTCs and can be seen as, for all intents and purposes, a continuation of their CPA at national and bilateral level through the multilateral system. What the case demonstrates is that the fact that dispute resolution in the multilateral trading
system is only open to states, has opened the possibility for MNEs to lobby countries in which they have an important economic presence, to represent their interests at the multilateral level.
Thus perceived dependence on an MNE can secure the leverage required with host governments to access the multilateral system. This mode of CPA is very different to that proposed by Baron, although it reflects his forecast that, as WTO became more important "…nonmarket strategies will be directed at influencing governments in which the company has located components of its rent chain to position issues strategically at the WTO…". 111 The PP case is an example of precisely such a strategy.
A revised conceptual framework of international CPA in the trade arena
In this section we draw on the case study material presented above to answer our key research question of the impact of globalization of value chains and trade governance on trade CPA. On that basis, we propose a revised framework to understand trade policy-making, reflecting these evolutions. The above analysis highlights that trade policy CPA is no longer a solely domestic activity, focused on clear domestic interests. Rather, it has become a multi-level process, operating across national/regional and multilateral axes, as interests increasingly cross borders and jurisdictions. The cases discussed above demonstrate the emergence of lobbying coalitions combining domestic (import dependent) firms and 'foreign' companies; as well as lobbying of 'host' countries to take action, both against 'home' countries and against third countries. As
MNEs have expanded their impact across their GVCs and shifted the fora of their CPA, so nonstate actors, especially NGOs, have evolved their own global strategies, including supportive 110 Certainly TTCs used the argument of legal uncertainty created by the WTO case to argue against similar legislation elsewhere. See for example, in Ireland, PJ Carroll and Co 2014 and PMI 2014 . 111 Baron 1997 lobbying with MNEs where they have shared interests and counteractive lobbying when interests are opposed. In Table 1 we providing a summary of the cases explored above along the main dimensions of the actors involved and their market and non-market context. The Kodak/Fuji case is included to highlight the main changes since Baron published his work in the mid-1990s. Our above analysis provides strong evidence that the traditional two country model of trade disputes, focused on importers in one country and exporters in the other, is outdated. Our understanding of CPA in trade policy needs to expand to include, on the one hand, third countries and, on the other, NGOs, which can be as active in the political arena as states or MNEs and whose actions have impacted, directly or indirectly, on the gambling, solar panel and tobacco cases discussed above. The main conclusion from our case analyses is that the international trade policy framework is now significantly more complex than suggested by Baron and others and, therefore, his conceptual framework needs to be revised. 112 In order to clarify the bases for our revisions, Table 2 highlights our key findings on the evolution of MNEs strategic responses to the changed global context. It provides a detailed summary of the novel aspects of the cases discussed above, the motivations for these innovative CPA practices and their organization. The Kodak/Fuji case is again included for comparison. In this case, the highly concentrated nature of the industry posed no collective action problems, with the main issue being trade access, rather than investment, the target country being the home country and no indication that NGOs were active. Table 2 Motivations and organization of novel CPA actions in the Cases covered Source -own elaboration.
In Figure 1 , we draw on the findings summarized above to propose a modified policy framework, based on Baron's, but reflecting both changes in trade governance and the move from domestic to transnational CPA. Although our framework reflects a two country modelcountry A (the exporter) and Country B (the importer) -the homogeneous two industry/interest model is deconstructed, while the possibility that companies will lobby beyond their home state is acknowledged. Govt A) to address the issue at the multilateral level, becomes an option. One further evolution we note is that companies also lobby countries outside of even their host country policy space. Providing that they have a positive impact on the country's economy, for example through their imports, MNEs can have political leverage, even in the absence of FDI. In the case of recourse to action at the multilateral level, the same alliance of import-dependent firms (IDF in our framework) in country B and exporters in country A, which lobbies against trade protection in the former, may lobby country A to take action against country B. This happened in the footwear case, when the Chinese government was lobbied by EU importers to challenge the case at the WTO. In this case, EU import-dependent firms had essentially no FDI in China, which we would expect to be a prerequisite for leverage or legitimacy in such CPA. The presence of a large share of their GVC in China was sufficient to create common interests with local exporters and facilitate successful CPA there.
Of course not all firms are willing, or able, to pursue an international CPA strategy. Based on our analysis and existing work, we suggest that the following conditions are necessary for companies to engage in the type of transnational lobbying described here. Firstly, the firm in question must be confronted with both a policy measure that poses a serious threat to its material interests and high expected adjustment costs. As Lawton and McGuire have pointed out, there are several potential adjustment strategies available to companies in response to trade policy changes, but the feasibility of these strategies varies extensively across industrial sectors. 114 The likelihood of political action is particularly high when adjustment options are limited and firms thus face high costs from policy change.
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A second key reason for transnational lobbying, highlighted in Thirdly, the companies in question need to be able to overcome collective action problems, identify a legal line of attack and access the policy-making machinery in a foreign country. None of these is straightforward to achieve. International CPA for WTO action is even more time and resource consuming than traditional dispute initiation through domestic CPA. Only the most internationalized firms, operating in well-endowed sectors, with a high concentration ratio and a high mobilization rate are likely to be able to engage in such a strategy. 120 6
Contributions, limitations, and future research
In this paper we address the question of how the globalization of production networks and expanded trade governance has impacted on CPA. We draw on a series of recent trade conflicts to identify several changes in CPA in the international trade policy arena, which we believe are strategic responses to the globalization of production and the expansion in coverage, as well as complexity, of the international trade governance regime. In doing so, we contribute to the literature which seeks to explain how CPA adapts to changes in the institutional environment.
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Firstly by highlighting how, as trade and investment liberalization has facilitated cross-border integration of production networks, the range of 'domestic' companies that get involved in trade politics has expanded. In particular, import-dependent firms have become increasingly active. Secondly, we find that the emergence of global and multi-level governance of trade policy has led to a shift in the targets of CPA. Transnational lobbying activities and political activity outside the home country have become more common, in particular with the objective of accessing the WTO DSB, but also to fight (regional) protectionism. Finally, we also note an increase in transnational advocacy by NGOs, who seek to impact on the governance of GVCs, 118 Lock and Seele 2016 119 Lucea and Doh, 2012. 120 Bown 2009 . 121 Lawton et al, 2009; Lawton et al. 2013. both in cooperation with MNEs and in opposition to them. We have argued that, as a result of these evolutions, the positions of companies, NGOs and even states on important trade issues can only be understood in the light of the complex interlinkages which characterize the contemporary world economy and the shared interests they create.
The main objective of this paper has been to better integrate these interactions into the conceptual bases of international CPA, by revising Baron's framework developed in the 1990s. 122 Clearly not all aspects of our revised framework are pertinent in any given trade dispute. We recognize that in most cases firms still lobby their domestic government to further their interests. However, we highlight several factors which are likely to stimulate MNEs to engage in such novel and 'transnational' CPA. In so doing, we expand our understanding of the motivations for company CPA, a key concern in the literature. 123 We hope that our framework will help trade policy scholars to better illuminate the role of different actors and their alliances and more effectively analyze how final policy outcomes reflect these dynamics. In addition, we see several promising avenues for future research based on the revised framework presented here, both focusing on the trade policy arena and on CPA in other issue areas affected by global integration.
Firstly, we see potential in work exploring how MNEs choose the political arena in which they play out the policy conflicts which they seek to resolve. In this paper we have focused on the multilateral (WTO) and regional (EU) level. Although there are good reasons to believe that CPA at this international level is likely to continue to expand, 124 the complexity and dynamic nature of such institutions, particularly at multilateral level, also make outcomes there quite uncertain. 125 This limits the attractiveness of this level as a venue for resolving disputes. MNEs need to make choices on how to allocate scare corporate resources across the different levels of potential operations, which implies making judgments on what level is likely to be the most productive. 126 We know little about the driving factors behind these choices. In this paper we 122 Baron 1995; 1997. 123 Doh et al. 2015; Hillman et al. 2004; Lawton et al. 2013; Shaffer, 1995. 124 Lawton, Lindeque and McGuire 2009. 125 Prakash 2003. 126 Windsor 2007. have highlighted some characteristics likely to encourage MNEs to undertake transnational CPA, however more work needs to be done to better understand the motivating and constraining factors behind such strategies.
Secondly, as shown in this paper, the emergence of GVCs has had an important impact on the type of actors involved in policy debates, their policy preferences and the incentives they face when deciding to mobilize politically. Ultimately, we believe that GVCs also impact on how public and private actors interact to produce particular policy outcomes. However, more work is needed that systematically investigates the implications of GVCs for CPA. It is clear from our analysis that the fact that many companies are now embedded in transnational GVCs means that their most likely corporate partners for CPA may be found, not in their domestic trade associations, but in their partners along the value chain. In the footwear, gambling and solar cases discussed in this paper, we witnessed the establishment of cross border ad-hoc lobby groups specifically set up as vectors for CPA on the case in question. Such temporary, single issue structures have provided important conduits for cooperative lobbying in several recent cases, expanding the 'coverage' of the coalition, 127 while challenging traditional ideas about the necessary preconditions for collective action.
Thirdly, the expanding role of civil society in policy-making creates both new threats and opportunities for MNEs. NGOs have been seen to be very effective at mobilizing around regulatory issues at national and international level, including on issues indirectly related to trade policy like public health 128 and sustainable production systems, 129 as well as directly on trade policy itself. 130 In the cases explored here, NGOs have impacted on MNE CPA both by campaigning against company interests (gambling and tobacco) and in their support (solar panels). CPA theory thus needs to expand its focus from a traditional view, where governments are the main actors in the regulatory process, to better incorporate the role of non-state actors.
MNEs often interact with NGOs in their corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions, but this work is frequently divorced from, and even incoherent with, their CPA activities. Several 127 Baron, 1999 128 Mukherjee and Ekanayake 2009. 129 Levy, Reinecke and Manning 2016. 130 Farrand, 2015; Schnietz and Nieman 1999 scholars have recently argued that this is problematic and that there is a strong case for MNEs to better reconcile these two non-market activities. 131 Such efforts would also increase the potential to build alliances. However, beyond their CSR activities, very little work has addressed how companies can more effectively work transnationally with civil society to achieve common interests. There is certainly potential for further research in this area.
Finally, recent changes in the international political climate, especially Brexit and the US election outcome, pose questions for the continued integration of both GVCs and trade governance.
Brexit will pose challenges to the EU and remove an important advocate of trade openness from the Union. 132 The Trump administration has threatened to withdraw from the WTO in the case of rulings against new trade restrictions. 133 Such evolutions highlight that protectionist forces continue to mobilize strong political support, posing major problems for globally integrated
MNEs and requiring them to continually readjust their CPA, revising alliances and targets. This paper underlines the fact that CPA evolves in reaction to opportunities and challenges created by the institutional environment. We expect this evolution to continue in response to future changes, requiring scholars to regularly adjust their understanding of how CPA is best structured and organized.
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